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INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY AND
DOMESTIC LAW
Adam L Muchmore*
INTRODUCTION

The first volume of the Penn State JournalofLaw & International
Afairs seems an appropriate place to think about the relationship
between international law' and other forces relevant to multistate
activity. This essay focuses on one such force-domestic law. First, I
suggest that domestic law has an important and underappreciated
role in regulating international activity. Second, I identify several
types of scholarship that might be particularly suited to a journal of
law and international affairs.
Broadly speaking, two types of law are relevant to
international affairs. The first is international law, consisting of norms
embodied in treaties, custom, general principles, and judicial
decisions that purport to provide rules for state and individual

* Assistant Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania
State University. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Tom
Carbonneau, David Kay e, Kit Kinports, Julia Lee, Catherine Rogers, and Steve
Ross. Kirill Lavinski, Brandon Merritt, and Keren Wang provided excellent
research assistance.
' For two opposing views of the nature of international law, compare
MARY ELLLN O'CONNELL, THL POWER AND PURPOSE OF INiERNATIONAL Lw:
INSIGHTS FROM THE TiHEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 132 (2008)

(suggesting that fundamental norms of international law are based in natural law
LIMITS OF
theory), with JACK L. GOlDSMITh & ERIC A. POSNER, Ti
INTERNATION.AL L.AW 10-17 (2005) (suggesting that many rules of international law
are a result of the rational pursuit of state interests).
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behavior that do not derive from the domestic law of an individual
state. The second is domestic law, the positive law of individual states
(including the laws of component states in federal systems).
Domestic law applied domestically can have significant
international ramifications. Domestic laws affect the way states treat
their own citizens and thus can implicate human rights commitments.
States also apply domestic laws to foreign citizens, implicating both
human rights commitments and rights of other states in traditional
public international law. Furthermore, domestic laws apply,
increasingly, to transactions and events that cannot be considered
purely domestic.
In some transactions, relevant parties are nationals of
different countries. In others, a party may be a resident of a country
other than the country of his or her nationality. Or, relevant events
may take place in more than one country, which may or may not be a
country where any of the parties have ties of nationality or residence.
Indeed, the relevant events can take place on the internet, and their
physical location could be interpreted as anything between
"nowhere" and "everywhere at once." The vast majority of these
multinational transactions are governed by the domestic law of one
or more of the various states relevant to the transaction.
Dramatic examples come from the multinational regulatory
enforcement activities of the United States and the European Union, 2
as well as the emerging regulatory activities of China.

This is not to suggest that U.S. and E.U. approaches to extraterritorial
regulation are identical or even similar. The two enforcement approaches are
qualitatively different. The United States makes use of criminal penalties, private
civil litigation, and prosecutorial discretion in ways that are rare or absent in the
E.U. and its member states. See Brandon L. Garrett, GlobaliedCorporate Prosecutions,
97 VA. L. Rnv. 1775, 1788-1793 (2011) (describing differences between U.S. and
European approaches to prosecuting white collar and corporate crime). The E.U.
relies far less on regulatory enforcement, and more on the desire of multinational
companies to provide products and services that can be sold in European markets.
See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Efet, 107 NW. U. L. RFv. (forthcoming 2012/2013)
(uly 1, 2012 draft on file with author) (describing a "Brussels effect" in product
regulation similar to the "California effect" previously identified in U.S.
environmental regulation).
2
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In the United States, the largest antitrust fines are routinely in
international cases, 3 with at least twenty fines over $100 million in the
past fifteen years.4 The largest, a $500 million fine in a vitamin case, is
now over ten years old.5 The U.S. Internal Revenue Service has
brought UBS, a major Swiss bank, to its knees over assisting U.S.
clients in tax evasion-the first major crack in the long history of
Swiss bank secrecy.' In 2009, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) imposed a fine of $536
million U.S. dollars against another Swiss bank, Credit Suisse, for
assisting clients in evading U.S. economic sanctions. In the first eight
months of 2012, OFAC collected over $600 million in penalties for
violations of U.S. economic sanctions.8 And enforcement of the
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
Yielding a Coporate Fine of $10

DTsLION, Sherman Act Violations
Million or More, http :/wy
.ustice.gov/

ANTITRUST

atr/public/criminal/shermanl0.html (last visited Oct 24, 2012).
4

Id.

5 Id. On September 21, 2012 AU Optronics Corp. issued a press release
indicating that a federal district court had imposed a fine of $500 million U.S.
dollars in an antitrust case. Press Release, AU Optronics Corp (Sept. 21, 2012),
htt://,ano.com/?sn=1214&lang=en-US (last visited Oct 24, 2012). This matches
the largest previous fine (imposed in 1999 against F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd.) in
nominal terms. See Sherman Act Violations Yielding a Coporate Fine of 810 Million or
More, supranote 3. The company has indicated it plans to appeal.
6 U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OjQhore Tax-Avoidance and IRS
Compliance Efforts, http:/ /ww.irs.gov/uac Offshore-Tax-Avoidance-and-IRSCompliance-Efforts (last updated Aug. 1, 2012).
/ Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control and Credit Suisse AG, Dec. 16, 2010, \IUL-473923, http://www.treasun.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAXC-Enforcement/D
ocuments/12162009.pdf.
8 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, Resource Center-2012
Enforcement Information, http://www7\.treasury.ov/resource-center/sanctions/
CivPen /Pages /cipen-index2.aspx (last updated Oct. 22, 2012, 11:06 AM). The

vast majority of this total ($619 million) came from a single enforcement action
against ING Bank N.V. See U.S. DEP'' OF TIHE TREASURY, ENFORCEMEN'
http: // www.treasur.g ov/resourceFOR
JUNE
2012,
INFORNLYI'ION
center/ sanctions, CivPen/Documents,/06122012 ing.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2012). However, this is not out of step with other penalty totals in recent years.
OFAC imposed penalties of over: $91 million in 2011, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, Resource Center-2011 Enforcement Information, http: //www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Civ Pen/Pages/201 I.aspx (last updated
Oct. 22, 2012, 11:06 AM); $200 million in 2010, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
Resource Center-2010 Enforcement Information http://www.treasu y.gov/
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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) continues to be a priority for
the U.S. government.'
In 2001, European antitrust regulators blocked the merger of
the American companies General Electrical and Honeywell after the
U.S. Department of Justice had approved the merger.1 0 By 2008, the
European Commission had fined a major U.S. software company,
Microsoft, over C1.5 billion in several related antitrust proceedings."
In 2009, the European Commission imposed a (1.06 billion antitrust
fine against U.S. computer-chip maker Intel.12 Outside of antitrust,
the size of the European market makes it possible for European
regulations to dictate the composition, manufacturing process, or
other requirements for many products and services that are sold

resource-center,/sanctions, CivPen/Pages 2010. aspx (last updated Aug. 25, 2012,
12:23 PI); and $772 million in 2009, U.S. DLP'' OF THE TREASURY, Resource
Center-2009 Enforcement Information http://www. treasury.gov/resourcecenter /sanctions /CivPen /Pages 2009.aspx (last updated Aug. 25, 2012 12:23 P\).
9 See, e.g., Walmart's Mexican Morass, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2012, at 82,
http://www.economist.com/node/21553451.
10 Philip Shishkin, E. U. Members Endorse Move to Bar GE Deal,WALL ST. J.,
June 26, 2001, at A3.
" See European Commission decision fixing the definitive amount of the
periodic penalty payment imposed on Microsoft Corporation by Decision
C(2005)4420 final, 2009 O.J. (C 166) 08, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
/LexUriServ.do?uri= OJ:C:2009:166:0020:0023:EN:PDF (imposing fine of (899
million); European Commission decision fixing the definitive amount of the
periodic penalty payment imposed on Microsoft Corporation by Decision
C(2005)4220 final and amending that Decision as regards the amount of the
periodic penalty payment Case COIP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, July 12, 2006,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec docs/37792/37792 2186 8
42df (imposing fine of C280.5 million); European Commission decision relating to a
proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA
Agreement against Microsoft Corporation, 2007 O.J. (L 32) 50, http.//ur
lex.europa.eu/LextitiServ/Lexi riSery.do?uri01 :L:2007:032:0024:0024:EN:PDF
(imposing fine of(497,196,304).
12 Summary of a European Commission decision relating to a proceeding
under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case
COMP/C-3/37.990 - Intel), 2009 O.J. (C 227) 07, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUtiSery.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:227:0013:001 7:EN:PDF.
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networks, air conditioning units, and children's toys. 1 4
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foods,

social

China had no antitrust law before 2008, but it has already
become a significant gatekeeper in the approval of mergers and
acquisitions between multinational companies. By August 2012,
China's Ministry of Commerce had imposed conditions on at least
thirteen mergers, including at least three mergers between nonChinese companies that had been unconditionally approved by U.S.
and European regulators." This included conditions imposed on:
U.S. hard-drive maker Seagate's acquisition of the hard drive division
of South Korea's Samsung; U.S. automaker General Motor's
acquisition of U.S. auto-parts- supplier Delphi; and U.S. internetsearch provider Google's acquisition of U.S. cellphone manufacturer
Motorola Mobility."
These examples, of course, raise an important question:
where does international law enter the picture?" In terms of
See Bradford, supranote 2.
Id.
15 See, e.g., Announcement of Approval with Additional Restrictive
Conditions of the Acquisition of Motorola Mobility by Google, No. 25
(promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, -May
31, 2012) http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle,/policy release/domesticpolicy/
201206/20120608199125.html (China); Margaret Wang, China's Current Approach to
VerticalArrangements Under the Anti-Monopoly, Law, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, May
13

14

16, 2012, https://www.compeitionpolicyinternational.com/assets,/Free/cpiasiaw
ang.df.

16 Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, China's Antitrmst Regulator MOFCOM
Approves Google's Acquisition of Motorola with Conditions, Davis Polk Client NewsFlash
(MIay 24, 2012), http:/ /www.davispolk.com/files /Publication, 31 302b00-31 7b48a4-b718-a 53dfd28f23/ Presentation /PublicationAttachment /d9177 lbc-acOc4140-8a80-a9b727e6a885/052412 antitrust.html. It has blocked only one proposed
deal, Coca-Cola's unsuccessful attempt to acquire Huiyuan, a Chinese juice
manufacturer. Id. Because this involved acquisition of a Chinese company, I do not
include it in the above discussion of China's extraterritorial regulatory efforts.
t Id.
1s International law is undoubtedly relevant to multistate activity.
Whether its rules serve simply to coordinate behavior or exercise independent
normative force, it is something which matters to states. Their official rhetoric
relies heavily on the language of international law, GOlDSMITII & POSNFR, supra
note 1, at 168-170, and their resource allocation decisions indicate that thev value
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international law doctrine, it enters with the law of international
prescriptive jurisdiction, the body of international law relating to
when states can prescribe legal rules to affect conduct that is not
purely domestic.19 Treatises, casebooks, and law-reform efforts set
out a group of categories that are said to justify such prescriptive
jurisdiction. 2 1)Territory and nationality start the list as generallyaccepted categories. 21 These are typically followed by effects-based
jurisdiction, sometimes with the proviso that jurisdiction based on
physical effects is more broadly accepted than jurisdiction based on
economic effects.22 After effects, passive personality jurisdiction
(based on harm to a state's nationals)23 and protective jurisdiction
(based on harm to a state's security interests) 24 round out the list of
standard grounds. A principle of "reasonableness" is sometimes set
out as a limit on activities otherwise falling within one or more
categories.2 5
Tniversal jurisdiction is included at the end of most lists,
setting out the idea that for a very limited set of offenses (piracy is

technical competence in international law analysis. Yet public international lawparticularly in its formalistic sense-generates academic attention that may exceed
this admitted substantive importance. It may be of great concern to lawyers in
ministries of foreign affairs, non -governmental advocacy organizations, and
international trade and arbitration practice groups. But to the vast majority of
attorneys dealing with international issues, "international law" is not of primary
concern. Domestic law has far more importance to the mundane, daily activities of
international business-the movement of goods, money, persons, and technologies
across international boundaries.
19 See RESTATEMLENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REiATIONS L.AW OF THE

UNITED STATES 3 401 (1987) (distinguishing between jurisdiction to prescribe,
jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce).
2( See, e.g., Harvard Research on International Law, Jurisdictionwith Respect
to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 435, 445 (1935). See also RESTATEMENT (TIRD)
OF FoREIGN RLAIlONS LAYW OF iHL UNITED STiES § 402 (1987).
21 RESiTEMLNT1(THIRD)

OF

FORLIGN

RALAIIONS

LAYW

OF THE

UNITED STATIES § 402(1) (a)-(b) (1987) (territory); RESTi'TEMENT (THIRD) OF
FORLIGN RELuTiONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATEIS § 402(2) (1987) (nationality).
22 RESTA1MLNT1(THIRD)

OF

FORLIGN

RELuIONS

LAYW

OF THE

UNITED STiE'S § 402(1)(c) (1987) (not distinguishing between physical and
economic effects); id. cmt. d (discussing possible distinction between physical and
economic effects).
23 Id. at 3 402, cmt. g (1987).
24 Id. at 3 402(3); id. cmt. f (1987).
25 Id. at 3 403 (1987).
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usually listed as the paradigmatic example), any state may exercise
jurisdiction.2 6
Yet, despite the technical names, it is not clear that these
jurisdictional categories-even if applied strictly-would limit state
behavior in typical enforcement actions. The number of situations in
which states have an incentive to apply their law extraterritorially, but
that do not fall into one of these categories (involving a national, an
event on state territory, a physical or economic effect on state
territory, harm to a national, or harm to the state's security interests),
seems small. Accordingly, the public international law of prescriptive
jurisdiction may serve more to enable than to constrain state action.
To the extent "reasonableness" is an international-law requirement (a
contested proposition), 27 it would appear to do more work than any
of the jurisdictional categories themselves.
This apparent prevalence of domestic over international law
in governing multinational activities makes it a subject worthy of
sustained analysis. Academic writing certainly has addressed the
extraterritorial application of domestic law. Some articles oppose
extraterritorial application of the particular laws, 28 others favor of it, 29

26

Id. at § 404 (1987).

27 See Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The
Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 53, 54-55 (1995) (questioning the

assertion that international law contains a "reasonableness" requirement); Jack L.
Goldsmith, Book Review, Internationa Litigation and the QuestJr Reasonableness: Essays
in Private InternationalLaw, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 392-93 (1997) (same).
28 See, eg., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous
ExtraterritoriaiyofAmerican SecuritiesLaw, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 208 (1996)
(questioning the value of extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law); Austen
Parrish,ReclaimingInternationalLaw from Extraterritoriality,93 MINN. L. R\. 815, 874
(2009) (arguing that extraterritorial application of domestic law erodes cooperation
and is accordingly harmful to the international system).
29 See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of InternationalComity, 71 LNW &
CONTEMLP. PROBS. 19, 38 (2008) (arguing against comity-based deference to
international markets); Anthony J. Colangelo, ConstitutionalLimits on Extraterritorial
juisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and InternationalLaw, 48 H ARV.
INT'L L. J. 121, 124-25, 188 (2007) (arguing for new constitutional test that would
permit expansive extraterritorial application of U.S. anti-terrorism laws).
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and there are many positions in between." Others articles focus on
conflict-of-law3 and statutory interpretation 3 2 theories. Some writing
offers empirical analysis of how lower courts apply the vague
standards that typically result (at least in the United States) from highcourt decision-making.
Yet the actual operation of domestic extraterritorial
enforcement programs receives less attention than it deserves.34
See, e.g., Larry Kramer, ExtraterritorialApplication of Amertican Law After
the Insurance Antitrust Cases: A Reply to Professors Lowenfld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 750, 758 (1995) (advocating that courts balance interests statute-by- statute rather
than case-by-case in extraterritoriality cases); Kenneth W. Dam, Extrateritorialityin
an Age of Globaizcation: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289, 290 (1993)
(criticizing the international economic policy implications of the U.S. Supreme
Court's HarjbrdFire decision).
31 See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Extraterritorialityand Conflict-of-Laws Theory:
An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism,39 HARV. INT'L L. J. 101, 104-05, 169 (1998)
(advocating that courts should apply a unilateral, rather than a multilateral, conflictof-laws theory when deciding extraterritoriality cases); Larry Kramer, Vestiges of
Beale: ExtraternitorialApplicationofAmerican Law, 1991 SUP. CT. RL\. 179, 207 (1991)
(suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court's Aramco decision was in many ways a
return to Bealean territorial thinking).
32 See, e.g., William
S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 90-91 (1998) (arguing that the
presumption against extraterritoriality should be treated as weak presumption,
useful as a means of determining unexpressed congressional intent, rather than as a
clear statement rule); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisalof the ExtratenitorialReach of U.S.
Law, 24 L.AW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 1, 1-2 (1992) (arguing that the presumption
against extraterritoriality should be replaced with a presumption that Congress
intends a statute to apply extraterritorially when extraterritorial application would
be consistent with contemporary principles of international law).
3
See, e.g., Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S.
Extraterritorialityin the Regulatory Sphere, 63 INT'l ORG. 459 (2009) (reporting results
of empirical analysis of U.S. federal court decisions in extraterritoriality cases).
34 An emerging body of work is beginning to address the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, ForeignAffairs and
the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-35, 3-4, 38-40 (2012) (reporting results of
empirical analysis of FCPA enforcement actions); Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA
Settlement, Internal Stjfe, and the Culture of Compliance, 2012 Wis. L. R~v. 689, 715-16
(2012) (suggesting that aspects of current FCPA enforcement policy may impede,
rather than promote, a culture of corporate self policing); Mike Koehler, The Facade
ofFCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907, 998-1001 (2010) (criticizing the use of
out-of court settlements to resolve most FCPA enforcement actions).
30
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Fortunes of international companies are made and lost by domestic
enforcement decisions, and senior executives increasingly find
themselves facing long jail sentences for white collar crimes, perhaps
even in a state that has never been their home." Given these realities,
there is room for additional attention to situations where the
extraterritorial scope of a statute is not seriously contested."
I. THREE IMPLICATIONS
The domestic source of many of the laws regulating
international business has several ramifications for understanding the
regulatory regime applicable to international activities. First,
procedures for conducting domestic investigation and enforcement
proceedings influence the degree to which domestic substantive law
actually affects international activity. Second, the same activity will
frequently be subject to the laws of multiple countries. Sometimes
compliance with all applicable laws will be possible; at other times,
compliance with one regulatory regime will necessarily entail at least
technical violation of the laws of another regime. Third, the types of
admissions and disclosures governments require to settle
enforcement proceedings will influence the success rate of related
civil claims.
A. Substance and Procedure
Legal historians have long observed that procedural rules
influence the scope of substantive law." Economic analysis has

5 See Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades,
Address at the 24th National Institute on White Collar Crime, (Feb. 25, 2010),
http://wxw.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.hin
(noting number of
foreign defendants serving jail time for criminal violations of U.S. antitrust law).
36 For a more detailed discussion of statutes with broadly accepted
extraterritorial scope, see Adam I. Muchmore, jurisdictionalStandards (and Rules), 46
VAND.J. TRANSNAT'I L. (forthcoming 2013).
7 See, e.g., F. W. ATITLAND, EQUITY-AJSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT
COMMON LAW-T\Wo COURSES OF LECTURES 295 (A. H. Chaytor and W. J.
Whittaker ed. 1929) (quoting 1 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON
EARLY LAW AND CTITEFLY SELECTED FROM LECTURES DELIVERED AT OXFORD
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described a similar phenomenon with respect to traditional crime: the
actual rate of compliance with substantive law should be directly
related to the likelihood that a violator will be caught and
convicted-an outcome that depends, in part, on the types of
investigative and trial procedure the law permits."
In the United States, at least three aspects of government
enforcement procedure heavily influence the scope of substantive
law. First, the executive frequently enforces broad, open-textured
(standard-like)" legal requirements. Second, a large proportion of
major government investigations are settled before trial (and
sometimes outside of court).41 Third, enforcement priorities change

389 (1883)) (observing that procedural rules have exercised a profound influence on
the development of English substantive law).
38 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 176-78 (1968) (suggesting that criminal activity is a function of
the likelihood of apprehension and severity of punishment). The likelihood that a
violator will be caught and convicted is itself a function of criminal procedure rules
governing investigation and trial.
39 On the distinction between rules and standards and its influence on the
effective content of substantive law, see Muchmore, supra note 36.
4o See, e.g., The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (2012) (prohibiting "[e]ver
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations"); The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (prohibiting "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security" the use of "any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance").
41 See Lars Noah, Administrative Arms-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations of Authort, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 873, 891 (1997) ("As is true with civil
lawsuits and criminal prosecutions, the vast majority of all administrative
enforcement proceedings result in settlements."). CJ Bribery Abroad: A Tale of Two
Laws, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2011, at 80, http:/.www.economist.com/
node/21529103 (noting virtual absence of trials in FCPA enforcement actions
against corporations); Free Exchange: Fine and Punishment, ECONOMIST, July 21, 2012,
at 35, ht: //xw.economist.com/node 21559315 (highlighting the frequency and
magnitude of corporate settlements in the 2012 summer in both the U.S. and the
U.K.); Milton Handler, Antitrust: Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U. L.
R\. 211, 240 n.149 (1977) (setting out statistics from the U.S. Department of
Justice's Antitrust Division on cases settled by consent decree between 1962 and
1974). The second observation may explain part of the first, but that is beyond the
scope of this essay. On the wide breadth of federal criminal law and its relation to
government settlement power, see Samuel Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1662-63 (2007).
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over time, with available resources, and according to the preferences
of government officials. 4 2
Accordingly, understanding what the law "is" in a particular
area subject to regulation requires more than a simple reading of
written laws and published court decisions. A party seeking to
comply with the most restrictive possible reading of every
government requirement would not only face severe competitive
pressures, but would frequently be conforming its behavior to a
standard beyond that intended43 by the requirements' drafters.4 4
Intelligent compliance requires an analysis of current and potential
future government policies. Potential sources include speeches by
government officials, formal policy statements, and perhaps most
importantly, information about the factual background of prior
enforcement actions and the terms on which those actions were
resolved.4 5

42 According to press reports, the U.S. Department of Justice was
pursuing only eight FCPA cases in 2001. Schumpeter The Comruption Eruption,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2010, at 87, http: /w/A.economist.com
/node /16005114. It
was reportedly pursuing 150 as of April 2010. Id.
4
For those who accept the distinction between rules and standards, this
should hold regardless of one's view of the degree of intent that can be attributed
to collective bodies such as legislatures and agencies. Cf MLXLLL L. STEARN\S &
TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE: CONCEPTS AND APPLICAIJONS IN LY\w 264-80
(2009) (describing several academic theories skeptical of the idea of legislative
intent).
44 Such a strict view would of course be open to individuals, but is at
least arguably problematic for managers with a fiduciary obligation to maximize
shareholder profits. See JAMES D. Cox & TIIOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATIES ON THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 5 10:1 (2011) (discussing fiduciary duty generally).
45 The information available on prior enforcement actions vanes
substantially between regulatory areas and by type of settlement arranged.
Substantial information is available on enforcement actions resulting in criminal
plea agreements. See, e.g., U.S. DLP'T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD SLCTLION, FCPA and
Related Enforcement Actions, http://wxw.justice.gov/ciminal/fraud/fcpa
cases/a.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (listing docket numbers and including
public court filings for over 200 FCPA enforcement actions dating back to 1977).
Far less detailed information is available on enforcement proceedings resulting in a
confidential settlement. For an example from the domestic biotechnology context,
see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVT.,
Biotechnology Regulatory Services, Noncompliance History, http://ww.aphis.
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B. Multiple Regulatory Regimes
The scope of the modern regulatory state means that most
international actors will face legal requirements from two or more
states. (While questions remain at the margins and as a matter of legal
doctrine, it is largely settled that states can regulate some things
outside of their physical territory-and, in fact, may need to do so in
order to maintain basic territorial control.)46
Differences in legal requirements exist along a continuum.
(See Figure 1.) At one end are differences in substantive policy. At
the opposite end are differences in technical requirements.4
Somewhere near the middle are the numerous procedural rules that
implicate significant substantive concerns.

Substantive
policy

Procedure with
substantive

Technical
requirements

imolications

Figure 1.
An example of the first extreme, differences in substantive policy, is
the content-or existence-of antitrust law. For over a century now,
antitrust law has been a basic part of U.S. economic policy. 48 Other

usda.gov/biotechnology/compliance histor.shtml (last updated Aug. 4, 2011)
(providing only short summaries of most enforcement actions).
46

Cf JACK

GOLDSMIIH &

TIM Wu,

WHO CONTROLSTHE INTERNET:
ILLUSIONS O1 A BORDERLLSS WORLD, 155-156 (2006) (noting that states frequently

seek to protect their citizens from foreign harms, and often do so by extraterritorial
application of domestic law).
47 There may of course be some borderline areas, but the basic
distinction is useful for analytical purposes. Cf Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality
and Conjicts ofJunsdiction, 77 AM. Soc. INT'l L. PROC. 370, 373 (1983).
48 Although still far less developed, it is possible that anti-bribery laws
may be becoming a similarly constitutive aspect of U.S. foreign economic policy.
Like antitrust law in the latter half of the last century, the United States still
enforces laws against foreign bribery more aggressively than any other country. See
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countries have adopted economic
development of national industrial
fundamentally opposed to U.S. antitrust
European countries adopted this type
China is perhaps the best example."'

policies encouraging the
leaders in ways that are
principles. Historically many
of economic policy;49 today

2012

Differences in substantive policy are difficult to resolve
through technocratic negotiation, and decisions to pursue or drop
major enforcement actions may involve the highest levels of
government." Differences in substantive policy also have been

TRANSPARENCY INT'L, PROGRESS REPORT 2011: ENFORCEMENT OF TIlE OECD
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 8-9 (2011), http://ww.transparency.org/content/

download/61106/978536 (showing Germany is the only country that is beginning
to come close). However, there is increasing convergence between the United
States and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries in at least the formal prohibition on foreign bribery. See OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec, 17, 1997, T.I.A.S. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 7,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/1838028044.pdf,
OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions: Ratification Status, Mar. 2009, http://-ww.oecd.org/dataoecd
/59/13/4022933.pdf.
49 See KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMFRICAN BUSINESS

ABROAD 40-42 (1958) (discussing differing policies toward cartels in several
European countries); Dam, supra note 47, at 373-74 (discussing U.S. antitrust case
involving watchmaking cartel established with the support of the Swiss
government). On the strategic implications of the gradual (but far from complete )
convergence between the E.U. and U.S. antitrust regimes, see Anu Bradford,
International/AntitrustNegotiations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT'l L. J.
383, 405-410, 418 (2007).
so See Brief of Amicus Curiae the -Ministry of Commerce of the People's
Republic of China in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at
3, In Re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5466 (E.D.N.Y Jan. 20,
2011) (No. 06-ID-1738).
j
See Letter from Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, to Ronald Reagan, President of the United States (Mar. 29, 1983) (urging
President Reagan to intervene personally to block a U.S. antitrust investigation
involving U.K. companies in the civil aviation industry); Memo from Richard Burt
to George Schultz, U.S. Secretary of State (undated memo in preparation for Dec.
22, 1984 visit of U.K. Prime \finister Margaret Thatcher to Washington, D.C.)
(noting President Reagan's decision to direct the U.S. Department of Justice to
close its antitrust investigation involving U.K. companies in the civil aviation
industry); Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting between U.S. President Ronald
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prominent in disputes over criminal penalties for insider trading
(where the United States has criminalized actions that were only civil
violations in some Asian countries)5 2 and over the sale of Nazi
memorabilia (where some European countries have prohibited
actions that would be protected by the First Amendment in the
United States). 3
An example of the second extreme, differences in technical
requirements, is a form that needs to be filed reporting certain
information relating to a particular transaction. For example, a firm
may need to file different disclosure documents in different
jurisdictions. So long as one jurisdiction does not require withholding
of information that another jurisdiction requires disclosed, the firm is
able to comply with the technical requirements of more than one
jurisdiction. Many differences in technical requirements lead to
increased compliance costs but few substantive problems.
In between the two extremes are procedural rules with
substantive implications. These rules, while phrased in terms of
procedure, can create conflicting requirements or differing incentive
structures that in effect alter the substantive requirements of a law.

Reagan and U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Dec. 28, 1984) (noting that
Prime Minister Thatcher "expressed her immense gratitude for the President's
courageous decision" to halt the antitrust investigation involving U.K. companies
in the civil aviation industry, but indicating her displeasure at learning that the
Reagan Administration did not plan to introduce legislation to remove the treble
damages provision from U.S. antitrust law). These documents are available at the
website of the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, httw://

\.marvarettlhatcher.or/.

See also Dam, supranote 47, at 374.
52 See Insider Trading in Hong Kong: To the Dungeon, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17,
2009, at 35 http: //uvw.economist.com/node. 14460534 ("[i]nsider trading was
not even a criminal offense in Hong Kong until 2003"); Anthony Lin, Letter From
Asia: Landmark Decision Reached in First Hong Kong Insider Trading Trial, AM L w
DAILY
(Mar.
13,
2009),
http:/ /amlawdaily. tepad.com/Zamlawdaily/
2009/03/hone-kones-first-criminal-trial-for-insider-tradinQ-has-resulted-in-theconviction-of-a-former-investment-banker-and-fou.html (noting that before 2003,
insider trading was only a civil offense in Hong Kong "and was rarely punished").
3 See, e.g., UEJF et Licra c/Yahoo! Inc., No. RG: oo/05308 (Tribunal de
grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000)
(Fr.), English translation available at http://www.uriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/
vauctions20000522.htm.
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Examples include many of the procedural rules that have historically
led to conflict between the United States and the European countries.
On the U.S. side, these include: private-attorney-general provisions;5
treble damages provisions;" and extensive mandatory discovery." On
the European side, they include blocking statutess and banking
secrecy laws."
These regulatory conflicts often involve differences that are
difficult to resolve through purely legal analysis. Whatever the role of
power in public international law," differences in substantive policy
frequently involve situations where state power dictates the outcome
of a dispute. Powerful countries can exercise more extraterritorial
authority than weak countries. Countries with assets relevant to

54 See generaly Hannah Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global

Age: Public Interests in Private InternationalAntitrustLitigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219,
222-223 (2001) (describing private-attorney-general provisions).
55 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 315 (2006) (providing that "any person who shall be

injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws" may sue to "recover threefold the damages by him sustained").
6 See FED. R. CT. P. 26(b)(1) (providing for discovery "regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense"); see also GARY
B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CT11 LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 941-62 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing disputes over U.S. discovery
orders requiring production of materials located abroad).
57 See generaly BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 56, at 649-50 (describing
blocking statutes).
'8 See Don't Ask, Won't Tell Amid a Global Squeege on Tax Evasion,
Switerland is the Prime Target, ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2012, at 46 ("Swiss law
entrenched bank secrecy in 1934, making it a criminal offence to reveal a client's
identity."), http://ww.economist.com

node/21547229.

19 Compare W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of
Communication, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 101,

105, 108, 110-111

(1981)

(describing international lawmaking as a process of communication dependent in
part on state power) and GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 39-40 (describing
customary international law as a product of state pursuit of rational self-interest)
with Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisions in International
Law, 119 HALR\. L. RE. 1404, 1415, 1440 (2006) (asserting that states have a
"moral and legal obligation" to comply with international law) (reviewing
Gol DSM\LITTI & POSNER, supra note 1).
60 Of course, weaker countries may choose to operate extraterritoriality in
areas of high concern to them, but the costs they suffer will limit them in this area
more than similar costs limit powerful countries. See -Muchmore,supra note 36.
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particular substantive areas can exercise more authority in those areas
than similarly powerful countries without relevant assets.
This is not to suggest that state power is the only determinant
of extraterritorial scope. To the extent international law serves as a
limit on state behavior, the international law of prescriptive
jurisdiction may limit the scope of state extraterritoriality. Outside of
legal requirements, the ability of private actors to relocate or
influence domestic political processes (including both the scope of
law and the exercise of enforcement discretion) can substantially limit
what a country can do both inside and outside its territory. 62
C. Admissions, Information Disclosure, and Civil Litigation
Many U.S. federal laws are enforced by both government
action and private civil litigation.
This has two important
consequences. First, the executive branch of government does not
retain exclusive authority over whether to begin an extraterritorial
enforcement action. Second, targets of government enforcement
must consider the potential for follow-on civil litigation after a
government enforcement proceeding is concluded.64
A substantial majority of major enforcement proceedings
initiated by the U.S. government are resolved through settlement
rather than trial.6 ' These settlements fall into three primary categories:
guilty pleas to criminal charges; civil or criminal settlements involving
61 Relevant assets would include financial centers (securities and banking
regulation), large markets (antitrust and product safety regulation), and natural
resources (regulation of those resources).

62

See ALiBERT

O. HIRSC IMAN, EXIT, VOICF, AND LOYXATY: RESPONSES

io DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZVTIONS, AND STiTES 15-20 (1970) (introducing
concepts of economics -based "exit" and politics-based "voice" as two opposing
ways of influencing the behavior of an organization).
63 Two well-known examples are the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15

3

U.S.C. 3 15, and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
78j. On the
relationship between government enforcement proceedings and private civil

litigation, see Stephen Shavell, Liabili' Jor Harm Versus Regulation of Sa/ety, 13

J.

LEGAL STUD. 357, 358, 372-74 (1984) (discussing "four determinants of the relative
desirabilit of liability and regulation").
64 Or follow on government enforcement after a private civil proceeding.
65

See supra note 41.
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an admission of wrongdoing (including non-prosecution and deferred
prosecution agreements); and settlements "neither admitting nor
denying wrongdoing.""
The tendency of regulated parties to settle rather than force
the government to try its case relates in part to the structure of U.S.
evidence law. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, either a judgment
in response to a guilty plea or a settlement involving an admission of
wrongdoing can have significant consequences in related civil
litigation." A judgment following a guilty plea is generally admissible
"to prove any fact essential to the judgment."" A guilty plea is also
perceived as causing substantial (and sometimes terminal)
reputational consequences for firms, and presenting risks to the
firm's operating licenses or ability to do business with the
government.6 9

Even without a criminal guilty plea, a settlement involving an
admission of wrongdoing can have tremendous consequences in civil
litigation. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a party's prior
statements are not hearsay (and thus may be admissible for the truth
of the matter asserted) if the statement is one that "the party
manifested that it adopted or believed to be true" -a criterion that
an admission of wrongdoing in a settlement agreement is highly likely

66

For

more

extensive

discussion

of the use

of non-prosecution
agreements and deferred-prosecution agreements in settling FCPA actions, see
Koehler, supra note 34, at 933-939.
67 Preclusion law presents
defendants in government enforcement
proceedings with a similar problem. Under the doctrine of non-mutual offensive
collateral estoppel, defendants face a significant risk in going to trial against the
government. A loss in trial against a government agency can in some circumstances
bar a defendant from re-litigating one or more issues in a related civil claim. See
Lewis A. Grossman, The Story of Parklane: The Litigation Oisis' and the EfficienllL
Imperative, in CIVIL PROCEDURE S'ORIES 436-38 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed.
2008) (noting the effect of non-mutual offensive issue preclusion on government
settlement leverage in enforcement actions).
68 FED. R. EVID. 803(22) (providing that judgments of previous
convictions-including those that result from a guilty plea-are not excluded by
the hearsay rule, even if the declarant is available. There is a requirement that the
plea be to a crime "punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year.").
69 See Buell, supra note 41,
at 1664-1666 (discussing reputational
consequences of indictment or conviction of corporations).
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to satisfy. Where a private right of action exists for the precise issue
that is subject to government enforcement-such as a securities
fraud action under SEC Rule 1Ob-(5)1 -forcing a company to admit
to wrongdoing could "remove ... potentially all barriers to private
liability, including trial risk for the plaintiff."72
These evidentiary rules give a government agency substantial
power to influence the enforcement target's later exposure to related
civil litigation. Consequently, the type of admission the government
requires should affect the amount an enforcement target is willing to
pay to settle the potential charges. All other things being equal, the
government should be able to extract a larger payment by offering a
settlement neither admitting nor denying wrongdoing. This option
will least impair the target's defense in follow-on litigation. The value
of this option depends on how much the admission would increase
the probability of the target's losing in such litigation, the amount of
that loss, the effect on possible settlements with future litigants, and
the expected effect on the company's good will.

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B). They are accordingly admissible so long as
they are relevant, FED. R. E\ID. 402 (providing that evidence is admissible only if
relevant), not unduly prejudicial, FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing that relevant
evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed" by its
prejudicial effect), and not excluded by other evidentiary rules.
n 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (codification of SEC Rule lOb-(5)).
72 Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Efects of Coporate Civil Liabi/it, in
70

PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM:

USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE

CORPORAIEI CONDUCT 87, 100 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds.,
2011); see also id. ("Class action plaintiffs could simply print a copy of the settlement
documents in the SEC enforcement proceeding, take them to a judge and if
necessary a jury, and offer them as admissions to support denial of a motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment, or even to support a jury verdict.").
n This should be true regardless of the strength of the government's case
at trial. At any probable government victory below 100% (at perhaps even then due
to transaction costs), the target will be willing to pay some marginally lower amount
for a settlement that increases exposure to civil litigation risk than a settlement that
does not. A possible exception is a target that is effectively judgment proof for the
amount of money at stake.
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II. UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Having discussed the importance of domestic law for
international activity, I suggest four methodological approaches that
may be relevant for a journal focusing on the intersection between
law and international affairs. These are grounded broadly in the lawand-economics tradition of legal scholarship.74
A. Law Outside the Courts
In studying purely domestic law, an important component of
legal scholarship has sought to understand how both law and nonlegal norms function outside of the context of court enforcement.
While a few scholars have moved in this direction in understanding
public international law,76 much international law scholarship
continues to focus on enforcement of international law by domestic

74 I do not mean to suggest economic analysis as the only relevant
perspective. I do believe, however, that the application of domestic law to
international activity presents numerous issues that can be usefully analyzed from
an economic perspective. Other traditions likely to offer useful insights on the
application of domestic law to international activity include comparative studies,
historical studies, and perhaps anthropological studies.
7 See, e.g., ROBERT C. EJICKSON, ORDER WITIOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLL DISPuIES 4 (1991) (presenting results of empirical study of
informal dispute- settlement among neighbors, and noting that findings "add to a
growing library of evidence that large segments of social life are located and shaped
beyond the reach of law"); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industg': Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICI I. L. REV.
1724, 1724-25 (2000) (analyzing role of extralegal norms in the cotton industry);
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1771-77
(1996) (analyzing role of extralegal norms in the grain and feed industries); Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: ExtralegalContractualRelations in the Diamond
Industr, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115-17 (1992) (analyzing role of extralegal norms
in the diamond industry).
76 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 26-35 (arguing that
many phenomena typically described as customary international law can be
explained through one of four models of states acting in their own self-interests);
Bradford, supra note 49, at 438-39 (analyzing international antitrust negotiations and
suggesting that existing incentive structures may lead rational states to choose
informal cooperation over legally binding commitments).
n The literature on the enforcement of international law in domestic
courts-particularly U.S. courts-is too numerous to cite. For two opposing views
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and international courts." This focus on courts has obscured the role
of non-court enforcement as a major determinant of ex ante behavior.
A deeper understanding of the dynamics of out-of-court regulatory
enforcement could have significant explanatory power."
B. Rational Choice Theory
By definition, extraterritorial application of domestic law
involves at least two states-the law-applying state and the foreign
state in which the law is applied." The power of the two states may
differ, but each state retains some ability to act unilaterally-both in
the current situation and in future interactions.
Rational choice theory offers tools for analyzing such
interactions. Whether through two-by-two games, extended form
games, or complex multi-level models,"' this theoretical approach
should offer insight into many interactions between states. Under
what circumstances can we expect aggressive enforcement by one
state (of, say, anti-bribery laws) to encourage, rather than discourage,
the other state from devoting additional resources to that issue?
on the degree to which international law can serve as a rule of decision in U.S.
courts, compare Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary InternationalLaw, and the
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV L. REV 869, 935-36 (2007) (arguing that the
U.S. Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Sosa v. AlvareZ-Machain only provided for
limited application of international law in U.S. courts); with Beth Stephens, Sosa,
The FederalCommon Law and Customary InternationalLaw: Reaffirming the Federal Courts'
Powers, 101 AM. SoCY INT'l L. PROC. 269, 271 (2007) (arguing that the U.S.
Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvare:-Machain provided for broad
application of international law in U.S. courts).
8 See, e.g., Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International courts: A
Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT'r L. 225, 225-230 (2012) (surveying existing
literature on the effectiveness of international courts and proposing increased use
of social- science-based research methodologies).
7 The emerging FCPA literature has begun to scratch the surface with
respect to out-of-court enforcement of U.S. anti-bribery law. See Koehler, supra
note 34, at 907.
8ti This excludes, of course, situations where a state's law is applied on the
high seas or in other areas not claimed by any state.
" See generally DOUG LAS BAIRD ET AL, GAME TIEORY AND TIlE LAw 10-

11, 50-52, 75-78 (1994); see also Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in
International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 253, 263-68 (2006) (modeling U.S.
negotiations for rule-based WTO dispute resolution as a two-level game).
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Under what circumstances can we expect a crackdown on one tax
haven to reduce, rather than relocate, tax evasion? Under what
circumstances will increased inspection of imports result in increased
product safety, rather than a relaxation of safety standards in the
exporting country? For these types of questions, an analysis of the
appropriate domestic-law policy depends on an understanding of
how foreign countries or their citizens will react.
C. Predictable Non-Rationality
Rational choice analysis is only one step toward a more
complete understanding of domestic extraterritoriality. Behavioral
psychology has demonstrated that individuals respond in non-rational
but predictable ways to particular situations.8 2 States are led by
individuals, who respond to constituencies of other individuals.
Applying cognitive psychology to leaders and constituencies should
refine-and sometimes refute-rational-choice predictions about the
consequences of particular policies.
D. Empirical Analysis
Congress frequently structures the extraterritorial scope of
statutes as standards, rather than rules. 3 Often the relevant
substantive law is also more standard-like than rule-like. This twolevel standard makes predicting how the law will be applied-and
thus, in a Holmesian sense, what the law is-difficult in borderline
situations. One solution to this uncertainty is the practitioner's
approach-a hunch based on years of experience (often including
non-public knowledge) analyzing similar situations.84 Another
approach, more suited to the academic setting, is large-n and small-n

82 See generaly Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. RL\. 1471, 1473-74 (1998) (proposing the use of behavioral
economics as a supplement to traditional, rational-choice-based economic analysis
of the law).
83 See Muchmore, supra note 36.
84 Cf KARL N. LIEWEJJYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH: SOMP LECTURES ON
LAW AND ITS STUDY 99-100 (1930) (noting that experienced practitioners rely on
educated "hunching" to predict case outcomes).
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empirical analysis of publicly available data." This could usefully test
rational choice, behavioral, and anecdotal conclusions about the
effective content of existing law."
III. NATIONAL AND GLOBAL WELFARE

I wish to begin this section by clarifying two things I have not
argued in this essay. First, I have not argued that international law is
not "law," or that states should be able to act contrary to
international law without risking negative consequences. My goal has
simply been to highlight the continuing significance of domestic law
to international activity, and to suggest some ways that this might be
relevant to legal scholarship. Today, all mainstream views of
international law see application of domestic law to multinational
activity as permissible in at least some circumstances. The way states
use whatever discretion they have should itself be of significant
interest.
Second, I have not argued that legal scholarship should limit
itself to issues that are of concern to the practicing lawyer. Many
issues that arise in private practice are fact-specific and tied to the
interests of individual parties. An academic article on these topics
might save a practicing lawyer research time, or serve a role similar to
an amicus brief for one side or the other. Although this may at times
be useful, it is not generally the most productive aspect of the
academic enterprise.
Instead, I intend to suggest that domestic-law enforcement
decisions play a major role in international policy-and that these
decisions may not have received the level of systematic attention they

85 See, e.g., Putnam, supra note 33. See generally Ran Hirschl, The Question of
Case Selection in Comparative Law, 53 AM.J. COMP. L. 125, 132 n.22 (2005) (explaining
differences between "large-N" and "small-N" studies).
86 For example, Oona Hathaway has done several large-n empirical
studies of treaty compliance. See Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to
Human Rghts Treaties?, 51 J. CONFICT RESOLUTION 588, 613 (2007); Oona A.
Hathaway, Between Power and Princtle:A PoliticalTheor of InternationalLaw, 72 U. Ci ii.
L. RFv. 469, 513-30 (2005); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE.L.J. 1935,1938-39 (2002).
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deserve. Moreover, there may be aspects of domestic-law
international enforcement policy that lend themselves to such
systematic analysis.
In particular, most national regulators are likely to face
incentives (such as democratic elections) that encourage them to
pursue national, rather than global, welfare. Moreover, many issues
subject to extraterritorial regulation involve collective action
problems.
The distinction between global and national welfare is
implicated because many instances of the behaviors sought to be
regulated by extraterritorial statutes involve costs outside of the state
that has the most direct ability to control the behavior at issue. A
cartel among Chinese exporters may increase welfare in China, but
reduce welfare (in a greater amount) within other countries. In that
case, the cartel is Kaldor-Hicks efficient" within China, but
inefficient at the global level. By applying (or threatening) to apply
their antitrust laws to the Chinese exporters, other countries may be
able to alter the incentives of either the Chinese regulators or the
companies of the cartel.
Collective action problems exist because enforcement
activities are costly and high levels of regulation can reduce the
competitiveness of national firms. Anti-bribery laws are an example.
Prohibiting domestic firms from bribing foreign government officials
is likely to reduce national welfare-at least in the short term-if
other countries do not enforce similar prohibitions. This is the
situation the United States faced after the passage of the FCPA in
1977."

More broadly, regulatory enforcement actions can have
distributional consequences favoring-or disfavoring-the economy
of the state taking the enforcement action. Few regulatory

See generally RICH ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TIE LAW 5
1.2 (8th ed. 2011) (explaining Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
88 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat
1495.
8
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enforcement actions are likely to be Pareto superior," even within an
individual economy."o The target of the enforcement action will
almost certainly be worse off Enforcement decisions are more likely
to increase net welfare 91 (with both winners and losers), although
even Kaldor-Hicks efficiency hardly can be guaranteed-some
enforcement actions may in fact reduce net welfare.
From a global-welfare perspective, Pareto superiority seems
just as unlikely, but Kaldor-Hicks efficiency raises concerns beyond
those present in purely domestic enforcement actions.92 Actions that
are Kaldor-Hicks efficient are welfare-enhancing within the relevant
society, but make some parties worse off Actions can be KaldorHicks efficient on a global level but have those made better off
concentrated in one country and those made worse off concentrated
in others.
Of course, similar situations exist within any state that has
political or geographical subdivisions. Still, at least as a matter of
political theory, concerns with the distributional implications of
Kialdor-Hicks efficiency are mitigated in democratic societies by
political mechanisms. National regulators are selected by national
political processes, and self-interested actions by state regulators are
constrained by mechanisms such as the U.S. Constitution's Dormant
Commerce Clause.
At the present time, no similar global political process exists,
and it does not seem likely that one will develop in the foreseeable
future. Accordingly, countries will continue to exist in a system where
they will be tempted to implement regulatory policies: (1) that are
Kialdor-Hicks efficient from a national perspective, even if welfare-

89 See generaly POSNER, supra note 87, § 1.2 (explaining Pareto superiority).
90 Id. (questioning the possibility of Pareto superior changes in the real
world); see also Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100
YALL L.J. 1211, 1216, 1229 (1991) (same).

91 See generally ROBERI
42, 47-48

COOTER & THONLS ULEN, LNw & ECONOMICS

ed. 2008) (explaining basic concepts of welfare economics).
92 CC Calabresi, supra note 90, at 1221-1227 (discussing distributional
concerns associated with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 3; LEA BRILMAYER ET AL, CONFLICT OF
(5th

LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALs 376 (6th ed. 2011).
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reducing from a global perspective; and (2) that, even if coincidentally
Kialdor-Hicks efficient from a global perspective, contain a
concentration of winners within the regulating state and a
concentration of losers in one or more other states.
In such a situation, an excessive focus either on the opentextured international law of jurisdiction to prescribe or on
formalistic domestic-law theories is unlikely to provide a complete
picture of the regulatory environment. These approaches can usefully
be supplemented by analysis of non-court enforcement mechanisms;
formal modeling and rational choice theory; incorporation of insights
relating to predictable non-rationality; and empirical testing.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have sought to suggest several types of scholarship that
could be particularly suited to a journal of law and international
affairs. There are of course many others, some of which may involve
"law" far less directly. However, regardless of the reader's views
about the nature and effectiveness of international law, domestic law
is even more relevant to the daily business of international life. The
literature on domestic extraterritoriality has focused extensively on
territorial
scope
in
borderline
situations; 94 those
where
extraterritoriality is already accepted may be a more fruitful subject
for academic analysis.
Absent world government or hegemony, states must find a
way to co-exist without a central enforcing authority. In such a
situation, authority, status, and the distribution of resources are
determined not only by strict rule-following, but also by actions that
push, bend, and even violate existing rules. Powerful states use
domestic law as a tool for these purposes, and back it with an
enforcement apparatus that dwarfs that available for enforcement of
international law. Yet, the ability of states-even powerful ones-to
apply domestic law extraterritorially is limited.

94 See supra notes 28

to 34 and accompanying text.
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These limits should be greatest when other states perceive the
relevant domestic enforcement action as promoting national, rather
than global, welfare. The limits should be lowest when other states
perceive the relevant enforcement action as promoting global, rather
than national, welfare. Other states may even wish to step aside when
one state takes the cost of global-welfare-enhancing enforcement
action on itself. Yet, this points to an inherent limit on globalwelfare-enhancing enforcement actions-anytime such an action
promotes global welfare, states have an incentive to free ride and
hope that other would-be enforcers step up to the plate (and bear the
relevant enforcement costs).
Viewing the state as a unitary actor9 5 suggests that globalwelfare-enhancing enforcement actions will primarily be taken when:
(1) a state determines that its national welfare is benefitted in an
amount that is greater than its enforcement costs; and (2) no other
state has sufficient incentive (or ability) to undertake a similar
enforcement action. Often, these conditions will not be satisfied for
particular global-welfare-enhancing extraterritorial enforcement
actions. All other things being equal, this possibility suggests thatfrom a global-welfare perspective-there is likely to be an
undersupply of extraterritorial enforcement actions that are KaldorHicks efficient on a global scale. This undersupply should be made
more severe by opposition from states who would be losers, from the
Kialdor-Hicks perspective, in the relevant global-welfare-enhancing
enforcement action.
Similarly, states will often have an incentive to undertake
enforcement actions that are welfare reducing on a global scale, but
Kialdor-Hicks efficient for the enforcing state. However, other
states-especially those whose welfare would be reduced-have an
incentive to oppose these nationally-efficient-but-globally-inefficient

9
When the state is not viewed as a unitary actor, interest-group theory
suggests that states will at times act in the interest of powerful groups rather than
of the state as a whole. See generally STEARNS & ZYWIRCKI, supra note 43, at 42-92
(explaining interest group theory). The overall analysis should not change, but
significant additional complexities would be introduced to account for the
differential ability of particular groups to pressure states to undertake, or decline to
undertake, individual enforcement actions.
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enforcement actions. This opposition should reduce, but not
necessarily eliminate, the likely oversupply of enforcement actions
that are in national, but not global, interest.
This conflict between national and global interests suggests
an additional perspective on Anne-Marie Slaughter's theory of
"global governance" through networks of national government
officials.96 Critics of government-network theory have suggested that
Slaughter's documentation of the many interactions between
government officials fails to explain why such interaction would
result in increased international cooperation." One possibility is that
government networks help to mediate this conflict between collective
action problems and the differing incentives to pursue global and
national welfare. To the extent that government officials (especially
executive officials with similar portfolios of responsibility) share
information, this could help states determine: (1) whether particular
types of enforcement actions would be supported or opposed by
other governments; (2) whether enforcement actions would be more,
or less, costly for one state to undertake; (3) whether another
government might be willing to take a contemplated enforcement
action; and (4) whether undertaking a particular enforcement action
would result in political capital that could be used to influence
another state's future enforcement decision. Regardless of whether
government networks eventually result in a reconceptualization of the
nature of sovereignty,98 they may already be playing a more limited
role. These networks may be serving as a forum coordinating the
interaction between collective action problems and the distinction
between global and national welfare.

See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGTITER, A NF WORLD ORDER 261 (2004).
97 See ERIC A. POSNFR, TIE PERIIS OF GLOBAL LFG .AiSM 41 (2009).
98 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 96, at 266-71.
96
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